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Abstract
We examine the wage patterns of Canadian less skilled male workers over the last
quarter century by organizing workers into job entry cohorts. We ﬁnd entry wages
for successive cohorts declined until 1997, and then began to recover. Wage proﬁles
steepened for cohorts entering after 1997, but not for cohorts entering in the 1980s
- a period when start wages were relatively high. We argue that these patterns are
consistent with a model of implicit contracts with recontracting in which a worker’s
current wage is determined by the best labour market conditions experienced during
the current job spell.
JEL codes: J31, O33
1 Introduction
It is, by now, well known that the real wages of workers with high school or lower education
have declined substantially in the last thirty years. Beaudry and Green (2000) and Beach
and Finnie (2004) show that, among males, birth cohorts of these relatively less skilled
workers entering the Canadian labour force in the mid-1990s received weekly wages approx-
imately 20% lower than those received by similarly educated cohorts entering the labour
force in the late 1970s. Morissette and Johnson (2005) show a similar pattern in hourly
wages for males with less than two years of job tenure without any substantial recovery up
to 2004. Furthermore, these studies strongly suggest that recent cohorts will have lower real
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1lifetime earnings than previous cohorts, as their returns to experience and/or tenure are
not higher than those of the preceding cohorts. These patterns are of concern because they
aﬀect approximately 35% of the Canadian workforce. Moreover, Friedman (2005) argues
that in a period when the majority of workers are experiencing stagnation or decline in
their wages, the openness and tolerance of a society tends to decline, suggesting that the
diﬃculties of low skilled workers could be transmitted to the least fortunate in our society
through political economy eﬀects. For all of these reasons, the strong decline in real wages
for the less educated is a matter of considerable concern.
Our goal in this paper is to take a ﬁrst step toward understanding the forces driving
the wages for this large group. In particular, we are interested in whether there is a way
to organize the divergent wage-tenure patterns of less skilled workers in order to put what
needs to be explained in clearer focus. We argue that an implicit contract model with
renegotiation provides an organizational framework that ﬁts the data well. Because in that
model, wages of higher tenure workers are related to those of entry workers through potential
renegotiation, this implies that explanations for less-skilled wages should focus on patterns
in entry wages. It also means that there is a certain amount of downward rigidity in low
skilled wages that could become important as Canada enters tougher economic times.
To frame the speciﬁc questions we wish to pursue, it is useful to start with a simple
description of real wage trends over the last quarter century.1 Figure 1 shows median log
real hourly earnings in paid jobs for men who have attended or completed high school
by varying lengths of job tenure.2 For all workers in the group, regardless of job tenure
(indicated by the line labeled “All”), median real hourly earnings began to decline in the
1980s and continued to do so until the late 1990s. Over the entire period, the overall decline
in the real median wage was 12%. For new job entrants (deﬁned as those with up to 12
months of job tenure), the median real hourly wage plummeted during the recession in
1Throughout this paper we focus mainly on male wages because they are not aﬀected by the potential
selection eﬀects accompanying the substantial rise in female labour force participation over our period of
interest and, thus, we view them as providing a cleaner measure of the eﬀects of underlying forces in the
economy. The underlying data is described in detail in Section 3.
2The educational data is limited to two categories: 0-8 years and 9-12 years of schooling. We focus on
the latter group, as this is the largest by far, making 75% of our sample in 1981 and increasing to 92% by
the ﬁnal year of our sample. Where applicable, corresponding ﬁgures and tables for men with 0-8 years of
schooling are available in an online appendix.
2Figure 1: Change in median log real earnings by length of job tenure, men,
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the early 1980s, partially recovered with the economic boom of the late 1980s, and then
plummeted again with the recession in the early 1990s. In 1997, median hourly earnings for
entrants were 26% less than they were in 1981. After 1997, entry wages increased, but by
2007 were still 15 % below their 1981 value. Wages for workers with 1-5 years of job tenure
followed a similar pattern to those of new entrants, albeit with declines that were smaller
in magnitude. In contrast, the median log real wage of workers with 11-20 years of job
tenure was ﬂat until 1997, at which point it began to decline slightly, while the wages for
workers with longer job spells (20+ years) increased until 1997 and then began to decline
gradually.3
Figure 1 points to a compression of the wage-tenure structure in the late 1980s and again
during the strong labour markets after 1997. These were oﬀset by expansions during poor
labour market periods. Such a pattern does not ﬁt well with the simplest spot market model
3In the online appendix, we present the corresponding ﬁgure for women with the same level educational
attainment. We ﬁnd a similar pattern, though both the decline and subsequent recovery of entry wages are
smaller in magnitude.
3in which all wages reﬂect a common productivity shock. However, it may ﬁt with an implicit
contract model in which ﬁrms oﬀer workers insurance against adverse productivity shocks
but are forced to match wage oﬀers from other ﬁrms to retain workers when conditions
improve (Malcomson, 1999). These models generate cohort eﬀects based on time of job
entry. When the economy is deteriorating, the wages of workers in ongoing job spells
are insured and are based on conditions and information available at the time the job
started, while those of new entrants reﬂect current conditions and only insure against further
negative shocks. The result is an expansion in the cross-sectional wage-tenure proﬁle. When
conditions improve, wages in jobs that pay more than the current entry wage are unaﬀected,
while wages in jobs that paid less than the current entry wage rise to match it. Thus, re-
contracting as conditions improve in the later part of the period under study would show
up as increased returns to tenure for cohorts entering after 1995 and a compressed cross-
sectional wage-tenure structure. Our primary goal in this paper is to investigate whether
this type of model does indeed provide a good characterization of the patterns in Figure 1.
In addition to exploring the role of implicit contracts for explaining wage patterns in
Canada, we make a methodological contribution to the literature on implicit contracts.
Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) develop a model of such contracts over the business cycle,
which has been tested using wage data from the U.S. (Beaudry and Dinardo, 1991; Grant,
2003), Canada (McDonald and Worswick, 1999) and the U.K. (Devereux and Hart, 2007)
with varying degrees of success. As our wage patterns do not appear to be stationary in
nature, we develop a methodology which allows us to test the recontracting model in the
presence of a more general stochastic structure than the AR(1) process assumed by Beaudry
and Dinardo.
In examining these patterns, we need to take account of strong compositional shifts
occurring during this period. As Morissette et al. (2005) point out, unionization drops
substantially over this period, particularly for new entrants, and the industrial aﬃliation of
less skilled workers shifts as well.
The results of our investigation indicate that the recontracting model provides a reason-
ably good ﬁt for the wages patterns of less skilled Canadian males over the last 25 years.
These results are obtained after controlling for shifts in unionization and industrial employ-
4ment, indicating that that the decline in entry wages depicted in Figure 1 occurred across
industry-unionization groups. This suggests that demand for low-skilled workers decreased
for much of the last quarter century, but that the wages of longer tenured workers were at
least partly insured against this development by their employers.
In the very last section of the paper, we provide a brief examination of potential driving
forces behind the movements in entry wages. We ﬁnd that about one quarter of the decline
in average entry wages for less skilled workers can be accounted for through the substantial
declines in unionization and shifts in industrial structure in this period. Controlling for
compositional shifts by focussing on nonunion wages, we ﬁnd that about 60% of the decline
in nonunion entry wages can be accounted for by movements in relative factor employment
in a manner that ﬁts with the type of induced technological change model described in
Beaudry and Green (2003, 2005). But whatever the forces driving the entry wage, the
results in this paper indicate that they are passed through the rest of the wage structure in
such a way that they are felt for decades after.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the theory and
empirical implications of implicit contract theories, and brieﬂy explain how our empirical
methodology follows from the theory. In section 3 we describe our data. In section 4,
we present job cohort wage patterns and investigate whether they ﬁt the implicit contract
model from section 2. In section 5 we estimate our model separately for union and non-
union workers to ensure that the patterns we discuss in section 4 are not an outcome of
deunionization. In section 6, we brieﬂy examine forces that could be driving the entry wage
pattern. Finally, in section 7, we summarize our ﬁndings and make concluding remarks.
2 The Empirical Implications of Implicit Contract Theory
The properties of risk-sharing labour contracts are summarized in detail in surveys by
Malcomson (1999) and Thomas and Worrall (2007). These models assume that productivity
follows a stochastic process and that risk-adverse workers have limited access to capital
markets. Workers are thus only able to insure against productivity shocks if ﬁrms oﬀer
insurance through a wage contract. The precise nature of the insurance depends on the
5extent to which the parties are able to commit to the risk-sharing contract. We outline two
variants: 1) contracts that are binding on both parties (full commitment), and 2) contracts
that are binding only on the ﬁrm (limited commitment with recontracting). Both these
implicit contract models and a simple spot market in which all wages just equal a worker’s
current marginal revenue product have implications for how wages are related across job
entry cohorts. In this section, we outline these models and their wage implications. Our
presentation follows Malcomson (1999) and Beaudry and Dinardo (1991).
In the canonical implicit contract model, workers are homogenous and each ﬁrm hires a
single worker. The output of a ﬁrm at time t is contingent on the state of the world, st, and
is given by Φ(st). Let st+j denote the realization of a sequence of states (st,st+1,..,st+j),
where the conditional probability of such a sequence occurring, contingent on beginning
in state st, is given by P(st+j|st) and st is observed by all agents. Firms are perfectly
competitive and are assumed to be risk neutral. Workers are risk-adverse and care only
about the wage in each period. Both the ﬁrm and the worker are inﬁnitely lived and share
a common discount factor β. Let x(t) indicate the wage for new job entrants in period t
and let w(t′,t) denote the wage in period t of an individual that started his current job in
period t′. If wages are determined in the spot market, then the wage equals current output,
x(t) = w(t − j,t) = Φ(st), for j = 1,2,.... (1)
More speciﬁcally, workers from all cohorts deﬁned by time of job entry receive a common
wage equal to productivity in each period.
In the case where the contract is binding for both parties, the contract provides full
insurance and competition drives expected proﬁts of ﬁrms to zero. Since expected proﬁts
are zero, the wage is equal to the expected present value of productivity, i.e., for a job
starting at time t, the wage in period t + j is given by





P(st+i|st)Φ(st+i) for all j. (2)
In this case, the wage for each cohort is determined entirely by conditions at the time the
job spell begins.
6Finally, in the case where workers are fully mobile, ﬁrms will have an incentive to “bid
away” workers working for other ﬁrms in some states. To eliminate such “bidding-away”





P(st+i|st+j)[Φ(st+i) − wt+i(st+i)] ≤ 0 (3)
for all j = 1,...,∞ and all realizations of st+j,
where wt+j(st+j) is the wage at time t + j of a job beginning at time t, contingent on the
realization of a sequence of states, st+j = (st,st+1,...,st+j). The bidding-away constraint
implies that j periods into the contract, the wage must be such that the expected proﬁts
of the ﬁrm are less than or equal to zero. The resulting wage contract is downward rigid:
the wage is constant until a state st+j is reached where the wage for new contracts starting
in this period, x(st+j), exceeds the current wage in the ongoing contract. To retain the
current worker, the ﬁrm increases the wage in the ongoing job contract to match the wage
being oﬀered in new contracts. This implies that the wage ratchets up over time:
w(t,t + j) = wt+j(st+j) = max{x(st),...,x(st+j)}. (4)
Let Ωt+i be the set of all sequences of states, st+i up to time t + i for which it has not
become proﬁtable to bid away a worker who accepted a starting wage x(st) at time t.
Equation (3) implies that the expected proﬁts at the time the wage was oﬀered are zero. It








i=1 βi  
st+i∈Ωt+1 P(st+i|st)
(5)
That is, the wage equals the expected present value of productivity, conditional on produc-
tivity not rising enough at some future date such that it is proﬁtable for another ﬁrm to
bid the worker away at a higher wage rate. In other words, the implicit contract insures the
worker against adverse productivity shocks but does not involve income smoothing when
7productivity rises, as it is not possible to prevent the worker from leaving for a higher
wage elsewhere. Note that the oﬀered starting wage will fall from one period to the next if
productivity falls across periods. The starting wage will also fall if the magnitude and/or
probability of adverse shocks increases, as workers pay the actuarially fair price for insurance
against these shocks in the ﬁrst period.
These three models can be nested in a single equation. For a job beginning in period t,
the wage at period t + j is given by
w(t,t + j) =

     
     
x(st+j) spot market model
x(st) contracts with perfect commitment
max{x(st),x(st+1),..,x(st+j)} contracts with worker mobility.
(6)
As part of our our empirical assessment of these models, it is convenient to deﬁne several
variables. Let Change(t,t+j) denote the change in the entry wage between the time a job
starts, t, and a later period, t + j:
Change(t,t + j) = x(st+j) − x(st). (7)
Let Ratchet(t,t + j) be a variable that measures the largest increase in the start wage
between period t and period t+j. If no positive increase occurs in this interval, Ratchet(t,t+
j) takes a value of zero:
Ratchet(t,t + j) = max{0,Change(t,t + 1),..,Change(t,t + j)}. (8)
Thus, Ratchet takes a value of zero in the ﬁrst year for a job cohort and remains at zero
until reaching a year t+k where Change(t,t+k) > 0. It then takes on and remains at this
value until reaching a later year, k′ where Change(t,t + k′) > Change(t,t + k),k′ > k, at
which point it ratchets up to the new higher value of Change(t,t+k′). If subsequent entry
wages between periods t+k′ and t+j are lower than x(t,t+k′) then the value of Ratchet
remains at Change(t,t + k′).
Let Below(t,t + j) be the diﬀerence between Change(t,t + j) and Ratchet(t,t + j):
8Below(t,t + j) = Change(t,t + j) − Ratchet(t,t + j). (9)
This variable measures how far the current start wage is below the highest start wage
experienced so far in the job spell. Using these variable deﬁnitions, the following equation
nests all three models:
w(t,t + j) = x(t) + βRRatchet(t,t + j) + γBelow(t,t + j), (10)

     
     
βR = 1,γ = 1 spot market model.
βR = 0,γ = 0 contracts with perfect commitment.
βR = 1,γ = 0 contracts with worker mobility.
where βR measures how responsive the wages in an ongoing spell are to the highest entry
wage experienced during the job spell, and γ measures the responsiveness of the wage
to movements in the current period entry wages that are below the highest entry wage
experienced to date during the job spell.
We assume that the wage determination in the models set out earlier occur within labour
markets deﬁned by skill and province. To incorporate this element, we write individual i’s
wage as a function of observed and unobserved characteristics as well as of the factors set
out in equation (10):
ln wt,t+j,i = α(t) + Xi,t+jβ + βRRatchet(t,t + j) + γBelow(t,t + j) + ei,t,t+j (11)
where Xi,t+j is the vector of observable individual and job characteristics of individual i
observed at time t+j, ei,t,t+j corresponds to unobserved characteristics, α(t) is a ﬁxed eﬀect
for the entry cohort beginning jobs in period t, and Below(t,t+j) and Ratchet(t,t+j) are
measured as diﬀerences in the logged entry wage. We use the log wage as the dependent
variable in order to provide comparable estimates to standard human capital regression
results.
9The business cycle variants of the above model that Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) develop
are special cases of the models nested in equation (11). By assuming that productivity
follows an AR(1) process, and explicitly modeling the reservation wage of the marginal
worker, Beaudry and Dinardo are able to replace the entry wage in a given period with the
unemployment rate, which is inversely related to the entry wage in all three models. The
spot market implies that wages are negatively correlated with the current unemployment
rate; the perfect commitment model implies that wages are negatively correlated with the
unemployment rate at the time the job starts; and the worker mobility model implies that
wages are negatively correlated with the lowest unemployment rate experienced during a
job spell. The advantage of making these assumptions is that start wages do not not need
to be measured directly. For the US in the period that Beaudry and DiNardo study, their
assumption of a stationary process for productivity appears to be appropriate, but it seems
unlikely to hold for the less-skilled in Canada in our period, where there has been a long
downward trend in wages. In that case, the unemployment rate does not provide a good
measure of recontracting pressures. In particular, the entry wages of workers entering in
the recession of the early 1980s could be above those of job starters in the strong labour
market of the late 1990s. In that situation, the early 1980s job starters should not seek
to renegotiate their wages in the late 1990s even though the unemployment rate was much
lower than when they started.
In our empirical implementation, we also allow for upward sloping wage-tenure proﬁles.
The implication of those proﬁles for how we should think about the cohort/contracting
eﬀects depends on the source of the positive tenure eﬀect. One possibility is that the
slope reﬂects worker and ﬁrm sharing of investments in and returns to speciﬁc human
capital (Hashimoto, 1981). If we assume the impact of such investments on productivity
are perfectly foreseeable then we can potentially treat them as separable from the uncertain
(macro) productivity shocks set out in the model. Workers, of course, might prefer to
have their portion of the speciﬁc human capital returns delivered to them as a constant
wage but ﬁrms may prefer an upward sloping proﬁle to address potential shirking. In
either case, because a new ﬁrm could not capture the beneﬁts of the speciﬁc human capital
investment, the relevant comparison in any renegotiation would be between the going entry
10wage (without tenure) and the worker’s current wage inclusive of tenure eﬀects. This raises
the possibility that a given cohort - if it is far enough along its proﬁle - will not have
a renegotiation of its wage even if the going entry wage is above the entry wage for the
cohort. We discuss and check the speciﬁc empirical implications of this version of the
model in section 4.3.2.
A second possibility is that a positive wage-tenure proﬁle reﬂects returns to general
human capital. In that case, outside ﬁrms interested in bidding a worker away will oﬀer
a worker a wage inclusive of the returns to job tenure. The current ﬁrm will not oﬀer to
smooth the wage over future gains coming from human capital accumulation, as this involves
oﬀering higher wages in the current period in exchange for lower wages in the future. Since
the worker is more productive in the future, other ﬁrms would have an incentive to bid this
worker away with a higher wage, even in the absence of productivity shocks. However, the
current ﬁrm may still insure the wage proﬁle against stochastic shocks. Interestingly, the
implied empirical speciﬁcation in this case is still based on the entry wage, as in (11). To
see this, note that an outside ﬁrm will oﬀer the worker the entry wage plus the value of the
human capital reﬂected in the wage-tenure proﬁle. But since the current and outside ﬁrms
place equal value on that human capital, the comparison again comes down to a comparison
of entry wages. While they do not explicitly discuss the source of any wage-tenure proﬁle,
this is the approach to tenure implicitly adopted in all previous papers on wage contracting
(Beaudry and Dinardo, 1991; McDonald and Worswick, 1999; Grant, 2003; Devereux and
Hart, 2007).
Finally, we have presented our discussion in terms of productivity and human capital
investment but we could also present the discussion in terms of matching models. In par-
ticular, in matching models, if match quality is revealed gradually and poor matches are
terminated, wages (which equal the average productivity of the workers remaining with the
ﬁrm) will rise with tenure. An overall decline in productivity could then be modeled as a de-
cline in the mean of the match quality distribution. If this aﬀects ongoing and new matches
equally and there is no change in the costs of forming or dissolving a match then there is
no reason to believe that the selection associated with the match process will change over
time, even as the trend changes. If, instead, the cost to a ﬁrm of dissolving a match rises in
11a tight labour market because the time their capital will be idle until a new match is found
lengthens then selectivity could diﬀer over our time period. In particular, in the tighter
labour markets after 1997, matches would be less likely to be dissolved which would imply
both lower average productivity for a given cohort and a lower slope to the wage-tenure
proﬁle. Thus, such selectivity, if it exists, will oﬀset to some extent the tendency toward
higher and steeper proﬁles that we have discussed.
3 Data
The data behind Figure 1, and the data we will use in our investigations, come from a
series of datasets, all of which are based on the common sampling frame provided by the
Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a large, national survey used to calculate labour
force statistics but, periodically, survey respondents are asked also to respond to special
surveys, and it is the latter we use here. More speciﬁcally, we use the 1981 Annual Work
Patterns Survey (AWPS), the 1984 Survey of Union Membership (SUM), the 1986-87 and
1988-90 Labour Market Activity Surveys (LMAS), the 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements
(SWA) and the LFS itself for the years 1997 through 2007.4 These surveys were chosen
because they allow for calculation of consistent measures of the hourly wage of jobs and
because they include a consistent question on job tenure (asking respondents when they
started their current job in the AWPS and LFS and when they started a given job in the
LMAS). The LMAS are two panel datasets but we use them as cross-sections with the
weights provided for that purpose. We limit our analysis to individuals between the ages of
20 and 64. For workers between the ages of 15-19, a large proportion of job entrants have
wages at the provincial minimum, suggesting that minimum wage changes explain much of
the wage variation for this group. The fraction of workers receiving wages at or near the
minimum wage declines substantially for older workers, suggesting that the minimum wage
is not the main driving force of the patterns we outline.
Data comparability is clearly an important issue in using a series of diﬀerent datasets
over an extended period of time. Morissette and Johnson (2005) use some of the same
4The LFS did not collect wage data prior to 1997.
12data for an examination of job quality and wage trends and include a discussion of the
comparability of the hourly wages constructed in each. They raise two issues of importance.
First, the speciﬁc questions on earnings in all years include the request to report “usual
wage or salary before taxes and other deductions,” but the LMAS after 1986 and the LFS
tell the respondents to include tips and commissions in their earnings while the AWPS and
the ﬁrst year of the LMAS make no explicit reference to tips and commissions. Further,
the 1987-1990 versions of the LMAS ask respondents to include overtime while the other
surveys make no mention of overtime earnings. Similarly, the surveys for our two earliest
years do not ask respondents about overtime when asking about hours worked while all
the remaining surveys ask respondents to omit overtime. Given that wages are constructed
by dividing earnings by hours of work, these two biases work in the same direction. The
diﬀerences in earnings questions will tend to lead to respondents reporting lower earnings in
the earliest surveys than the later ones, and the hours questions will tend to lead to higher
reported hours in the earlier surveys. Combined, these lead to lower calculated hourly
earnings in the initial two datasets, implying that the negative trend portrayed in this data
is, if anything, an understatement of the actual trend.
The second issue has to do with imputation when respondents do not report their
earnings. Morissette and Johnson (2005) report that both the LMAS and the LFS use
class of worker, province, gender, age group and education level as part of their imputation.
The LFS, in addition, uses student status, a renter/owner indicator, and occupation. The
LMAS uses union status while the LFS does not. As shown in Hirsch and Schumacher
(2004), diﬀerences in imputation can have noticeable impacts on wage diﬀerentials. In our
case, moving from imputations that include union status to ones that do not means that
union workers are imputed to have lower wages than they should, with the opposite being
true for non-union workers. Unfortunately, Statistics Canada does not include imputation
indicators on any of its datasets so all we can do is keep this issue in mind.5
Shifts in industrial composition over time are of considerable interest in the analysis that
follows and, as a result, issues relating to the comparability of industry categories in the
5Using the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), which uses a consistent measure of earnings across the
years it covers, we ﬁnd a very similar patterns for hourly earnings over the period 1981–1997 to those depicted
in Figure 1. Details of this exercise are available in the online appendix.
13data must also be addressed. In 1997, the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) scheme
was replaced with the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation Scheme (NAICS). Although
Statistics Canada released revised data for LFS incorporating the NAICS, the supplemental
surveys were not revised. We use an earlier version of the 1997 LFS, which reported industry
of aﬃliation using both the NAICS and the SIC, to produce a concordance between the two
systems. Using this concordance, we construct 14 industry categories based on the NAICS.
4 Job Cohort Speciﬁcations
4.1 Basic Data Patterns
We turn, now, to investigating the implications from the discussion in section 2. A key
feature of the datasets we use is that each reports job tenure as a continuous variable. This
allows us to construct and follow cohorts deﬁned by year of job entry, which ﬁts with the
implicit contract models discussed earlier. Thus, a cohort will consist of a set of people who
all started their current job in the same year, have the same gender and fall in the same
education category. Given the key role that entry wages play in the models that we are
interested in, we only retain cohorts for which we are able to observe wages at the start of
the job spell. Our main focus is on men with 9-12 years of schooling. We emphasize this
group because: 1) job entrants in this group experienced large wage declines over our study
period, as documented in Section 1, and 2) this group is heavily represented in our sample,
allowing for reliable estimates of the entry wage in each year of our sample.6
We do not have true panel data to follow these cohorts but we can construct synthetic
cohorts. In the case of the ﬁrst (1981) cohort, for example, we can construct their average
wage in 1986 (from the LMAS data) by calculating the average wage for high school educated
men who have 5 years of job tenure. For synthetic cohorts to provide consistent estimates
of the true cohort proﬁle, we require that the population from which the synthetic cohort is
drawn at each point in time does not change. This is less of a problem when constructing
job start cohorts than is the case in the more common birth cohort approach. For example,
6Men with 0-8 years of schooling experience similar wage patterns. We document this in the web appendix.
However, over our sample period, this group makes up a small and declining fraction of men with less than
12 years of schooling. In 1981, 25% of men fell into this group. By 2007 the corresponding ﬁgure is 8%.
14with birth cohorts, one might be concerned that immigrants enter the population, changing
the composition of a given birth cohort between one cross-sectional dataset and the next.
In our case, this is not possible since immigrants could not enter the economy with positive
years of job tenure already assigned. The number of observations at varying lengths of job
tenure is reported for each cohort in Appendix A.
In Figure 2, we present the raw data: average wages assembled by job entry cohort.7
Several patterns stand out. First, the proﬁles show a pattern of rising substantially over
the ﬁrst decade or so of a job and then ﬂattening out. Second, the earlier cohorts have
higher starting wages, and higher proﬁles in general, than the later cohorts. Third, there
appears to be a break in the data beginning with cohorts starting jobs approximately in
the mid-1990s. Before that point, the cohort proﬁles tend to shift down in parallel, though
with relatively clear eﬀects of the late-1980’s boom in the opposite direction. After about
1996, the proﬁles become steeper and entry wages rise. Notice that the mean wages at entry
follow a pattern much like that of the median entry wages in Figure 1.
The lines are diﬃcult to disentangle in parts of Figure 2. To provide a simpler picture of
the cohort patterns, we regress wages on a complete set of cohort dummies and a complete
set of interactions of those dummies with a spline in years of job tenure, thus creating
a set of smoothed, cohort speciﬁc wage-tenure proﬁles. The spline allows for a diﬀerent
slope after 10 years of tenure and is tied at the 10 year point. We plot those proﬁles for
a selection of cohorts in Figure 3. It is even easier to see both the break in the data with
the mid-1990s cohorts and the pattern of entry wages described for Figure 2. It is again
interesting to note the relatively parallel nature of the proﬁles for the pre-1997 cohorts. In
particular, there does not appear to be strong evidence that these earlier cohorts shared
in the steepening of the tenure proﬁle witnessed for the post-1997 cohorts. The 1984/85
cohort, which entered the market during a recession, diﬀers somewhat from the other 1980s
cohorts. In the context of a model of implicit contracts with mobility, this would be the
pre-1997 cohort most likely to experience wage gains as the economy improved in the late
1980s.
7In Figures 2 and 3, we deﬁne cohorts by two year groups in order to provide a smoother depiction of
trends. However, cohorts are deﬁned by single entry years in the econometric work that follows.
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It is possible, with this data, to track job start cohorts for diﬀerent age groups. Thus, we
can see whether the patterns in entry wages depicted in Figures 2 and 3 are present for all
age groups or whether the declines across cohorts we have observed so far are just disguised
birth cohort eﬀects arising because new job starters are disproportionately young. If these
patterns really reﬂect birth cohort eﬀects (arising, perhaps, because of diﬀerences across
cohorts in cohort size or the quality of schooling they faced) then we would expect not to
see the long term declines in entry wages for older new job starters. Figure 4 contains a plot
of entry wages (wages for workers with up to 1 year of job tenure) for various age groups
for the years covered by our data.8 These data show a clear impact of age on earnings
(which can be interpreted as a standard experience eﬀect given that we are controlling
for schooling), with 45-54 year olds having wages that are approximately 40% higher than
those for 20 to 24 year olds in 2007. The time paths of entry wages are also remarkably
8To create a clean presentation, we exclude 55 to 64 year old entrants from Figure 4. The wage patterns
are considerably noisier for this group, which may reﬂect either the small number of entrants at these ages
(less than 5% of job entrants in any year are over 55) or the diﬀerent types of jobs taken after early retirement.
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similar across the age groups, showing the same pattern of strong decline from 1981 to 1997
followed by either stagnation or slight recovery.9 Given this, there is little evidence that
the patterns we are picking up are masked age (or birth cohort) eﬀects. Instead, it appears
that a simple speciﬁcation with constant age premia and a common trend in starting wages
for all age groups characterizes the data quite well and this is the speciﬁcation we use in
estimating equation (11). This points to implicit contract models rather than models of
forces aﬀecting birth cohorts as the best way to approach the cohort patterns set out in
Figures 2 and 3.
These simple data plots provide initial evidence that the type of implicit contracting
model with re–negotiation we described in section 2 provides a useful framework for thinking
about shifts in the Canadian wage structure for less educated workers, assuming a U-shaped
trend for productivity. In particular, the 1981 cohort would have entered prior to the
9The largest group of job starters in any given year is the 20-24 grouping. Using the time series underlying
Figure 4, the correlations between the start wages for this age group and other age groups are listed in
parentheses: 25-34 (.89), 35-44 (.85), 45-54 (.59), and 55-64 (.40).
17Figure 4: Mean Log Hourly Earnings, High School Men, Up To One Year of























































recession of the 1980s when productivity was high and the subsequent secular decline in
wages from 1981–97 may have been viewed as a low probability event, making the cost
of insuring against it low. This would result in high entry wages. After the recession,
wages did not fully recover, potentially reﬂecting a realization among economic agents that
productivity for this group of workers had fallen and was likely to continue to fall. Thus,
lower productivity and a higher cost of insurance against further negative shocks would
have continued to erode entry wages. After 1997, entry wages leveled oﬀ and began to
increase. In the context of the model, this would reﬂect a reversal in the productivity
trend. The rising entry wages, in turn, would allow relatively recently hired workers to
recontract. However, workers hired during the 1980s would still be on high wage paths
that would imply no renegotiation. Thus, wage proﬁles for post-1995 entry cohorts would
steepen while those for the 1980s cohorts would appear unaﬀected by the turnaround. This
is what we see in the data plotted by cohorts and accounts for the pattern in Figure 1, where
increases in cross-sectional wage-tenure diﬀerences in the 1980s were replaced by decreases
18in those diﬀerences after 1997. In contrast, there is no evidence of the type of pattern one
would predict from a simple spot market model; a pattern in which real wages decline over
time within speciﬁc job cohorts during the early 1980s and early 1990s.
4.2 Econometric Speciﬁcations
We now turn to a more careful, econometric examination of the wage patterns seen in the
previous ﬁgures. We estimate equation (11) using a two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage,
we regress the log of individual wages on a vector of individual and job characteristics, Xit,
and a complete set of start year-job tenure interactions, π(t,t+j). The estimated equation
is thus of the form:
ln wijt = Xijtβ + π(t,t + j) + e(i,t,t + j), (12)
where, as before, i denotes an individual, t denotes the year in which the current job
started, j indicates years of job tenure in the current job, t + j indicates the year in which
the individual is observed, and X is a vector of individual characteristics which we describe
in the next section. In the second stage, we estimate the following model:
π(t,t + j) = α(t) + g(j,t) + βRRatchet(t,t + j) + γ · Below(t,t + j) + ν(t,t + j) (13)
where α(t) is a cohort eﬀect for the cohort entering jobs at time t, g(j,t) is a cohort-speciﬁc
wage-tenure proﬁle for individuals that started jobs in year t with j years of job tenure, and
the remaining variables are those described in section 2.
We estimate Equation (12) using the sample weights accompanying the various data
sets. As the dependent variable in equation (13) is obtained by estimating equation (12), we
estimate this equation using WLS with the inverse of the standard errors of the estimates
used as weights. The two-stage procedure corrects the standard errors of βR and γ for
correlations across the error terms, e(i,t,t+j), of individuals that started jobs at the same
time and are observed in the same year.
19Based on observations from Figure 2, we initially adopt a tied spline speciﬁcation for
the wage-tenure proﬁles, g(j,t), in which the wage proﬁle for any cohort is allowed to have
diﬀerent slopes before and after 10 years of tenure. As our Ratchet variable is based on
changes in the start wage relative to the start wage at the time a job spell began, we only
work with those cohorts for which we observe a wage at the time of job start. Using the
data described so far, this includes the 1981, 1984, 1986–90, 1995 and 1997–2007 cohorts,
giving us 19 cohorts. The 1984 SUM and the 1995 SWP are oﬀshoots of the LFS which
include only categorical variables for job tenure. As a result, we only use these data sets to
provide observations for job starters in these years, since the categories allow us to identify
workers with at most one year of job tenure.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Compositional Eﬀects
Table 1 presents information on the job characteristics of job starters in the years 1981,
1984, 1989, 1997 and 2007. The years 1981, 1989 and 1997 were chosen because they occur
at similar points in the business cycle. There has been a marked decline in the percentage
of new job starts involving union membership (a point also made in Morissette and Johnson
(2005)); this development began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. In 1981, 35.5% of
job starters were members of unions; this number declined to 26.7% by 1989 and plummeted
to 14.0% by 1997. As the ﬁgures from 2007 indicate, unionization rates of starters remained
low throughout the last decade of our sample. There have also been notable changes in the
industrial composition of new jobs for high school men. In 1981, nearly a quarter of new jobs
were in manufacturing. By 2007, that number had fallen to 14.7%. The proportion of jobs
in the primary sector also declined. Declines in these industries were oﬀset by increases in
the various service sectors. The age distribution of starters changed over the study period:
in later years, new starters were more likely to be over the age of 35. 1984 is one of the
few years in our data set which corresponds to the trough of a business cycle. The most
striking diﬀerence between this year and 1981 is the sharp decline in jobs in construction.
Given the substantial compositional shifts depicted in Table 1, we are interested in how
20Table 1: Job characteristics of male job starters, high school educated,
selected years
Start Year
1981 1984 1989 1997 2007
Age
20-24 36.2 36.1 30.9 33.1 33.2
25-34 36.7 35.0 40.8 32.2 27.7
35-44 14.0 17.2 16.2 21.5 20.1
45-54 8.6 8.5 8.6 9.4 13.5
55-64 4.6 3.2 3.6 3.8 5.6
Union 35.5 25.6 26.7 14.0 13.8
Agriculture 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.4
Primary 7.7 5.8 5.1 5.8 4.8
Construction 19.1 15.1 21.4 16.8 19.1
Manufacturing 23.7 23.2 22.5 19.3 14.7
Trade 17.1 22.6 19.1 18.1 18.2
Utilities 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.4
Transportation & 9.4 8.3 9.0 9.3 9.7
Storage
FIRE 1.8 2.4 1.5 1.9 3.4
Education 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.6
Public admin. 3.5 2.7 3.1 1.7 1.6
Accommodations/Food 6.0 5.6 5.2 8.3 7.2
Health and Soc. Assist. 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.8
Professional Services 2.7 4.2 2.8 6.7 10.6
Other Services 4.0 4.8 4.6 7.6 6.6
Mean Log Wage 2.64 2.48 2.55 2.40 2.50
Note: Job starters are deﬁned as workers ages 20-64 with up to one year of job tenure.
All means are generating using the sample weights included with the respective surveys.
21much of the overall wage patterns in Figures 1-3 can be explained by those shifts. We can
provide an answer using the ﬁrst stage wage regression described in the previous section.
In particular, the regression includes indicators for the age and province of residence of
the individual, controls for industry and union status of the individual’s main job, and the
complete set of tenure-year interactions. The results yield expected patterns, such as a
roughly quadratic shaped wage-age proﬁle and a positive union wage premium.10
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Figure 5 shows the estimated cohort eﬀect at the time of job start, π(t,t), relative to
that of the 1981 cohort, using the ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcation reported above. These eﬀects are
measures of the entry wage in each year, after controlling for diﬀerences in the characteristics
and jobs of entrants across years. The pattern is similar to what is shown in the previous
ﬁgures. Entry wages declined substantially in the early 1980s, partly recovered in the late
1980s, fell again in the early 1990s, and then followed a general pattern of recovery for the
remainder of the period. As age, industry and union controls are included in the ﬁrst stage,
these results indicate that the pattern for entry wages that we observe are being driven
10The estimates of the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcients are reported in the web appendix.
22Table 2: The Roles of Unionization and Industrial Patterns in Accounting
for Entry Wage Patterns
1989-81 1997-1981 2007-1981 2007-1997
Unionization -.02 -.04 -.04 .00
Industry .00 -.02 -.02 .00
Explained -.02 -.06 -.06 .00
Total -.09 -.24 -.13 .10
Note: Decompositions are based on average union and industry eﬀects over the en-
tire study period and are expressed in diﬀerences in the mean log hourly wage, after
controlling for age and province diﬀerences across entry cohorts.
largely by forces other than compositional shifts. Morissette and Johnson (2005) reach the
same conclusion for the period 1981–1997 using a similar methodology.
To provide a more concrete measure of the role of compositional shifts, in Table 2, we
present the results of a simple decomposition that focuses on the roles of deunionization and
industrial shifts using the estimates from the ﬁrst stage regression. As shown in Table 1, the
fraction of job starters that were members of a union in their job fell from 35.5% in 1981 to
26.7% in 1989, and to 14.0% in 1997. After 1997, unionization rates remained ﬂat. Based
on a average union premium of .171 log points, this accounts for roughly .02 log points of
the wage decline from 1981 to 1989 and .04 log points of the decline from 1981 to 1997.
There was also a shift from jobs in manufacturing and the primary sector towards jobs in
services, most of which took place after 1997. Based on estimates of the various industry
premia over the period, shifts in industrial patterns account for none of the diﬀerence in
entry wages between 1981 and 1989, and .02 log points of the decline between 1989 and
1997. Overall, unionization and industrial shifts account for roughly a quarter of the wage
losses experienced between 1981 and 1997. This is slightly smaller than implied eﬀects from
the decomposition exercise carried out for US wages by DiNardo et al. (1996). Interestingly,
none of the wage gains after 1997 can be accounted for by these factors. Combined with
Figure 5, these results indicate that compositional shifts are not the main forces driving the
decline and then rise in wages that interest us.
Another potential compositional factor is the increasing education level of the workforce
in this period. If the “most able” high school educated workers in earlier birth cohorts would
have obtained a post-secondary education (and moved out of our sample) in later cohorts,
23this could explain some of the general wage decline. However, our earlier investigation
indicated that the wage patterns do not ﬁt well with birth cohort based explanations.
Moreover, such an education selection story cannot explain the increasing proﬁles after
1997.
4.3.2 Econometric Results
We next turn to presenting the results from our second stage estimation. As discussed
earlier, the Ratchet and Below variables are key covariates in our investigation. Note that
we do not observe start wages for all years. However, the gaps in our data (early 1980s,
early 1990s), take place during recessions. Given both cyclical considerations and the longer
term negative trend that we observe, it seems reasonable to assume that start wages are
falling during these periods. As such, the value of Ratchet for any cohort in our data will
not be determined by start wages in these missing years of data.
Results for various speciﬁcations of the second-stage regression are reported in Table 3.
In the ﬁrst column, results are reported for a speciﬁcation without the Ratchet and Below
variables. The estimated spline coeﬃcients indicate that the proﬁles essentially become
ﬂat after 10 years. The cohort-tenure interactions are consistent with previous plots and
with the implicit contracting model outlined in section 2. That model predicts that cohort
speciﬁc wage proﬁles will shift down in parallel during the long decline and then shift up and
steepen after 1996. The estimated cohort-slope interactions in the ﬁrst column indicate that
proﬁles are parallel for cohorts entering before the mid–90s11 with the possible exception of
the 1984 cohort, which may have been able to re–negotiate its wages in the late–80s boom.
The proﬁles become much steeper for the later cohorts and the hypothesis that all cohorts
share a common slope and spline is strongly rejected (F24,123 = 4.34, p-value=0.00).
In Column 2, we include the Ratchet variable. Its estimated coeﬃcient is 1.13, which
implies that a 1% increase in the start wage above the highest start wage experienced so
far during a particular job spell results in a 1.13% increase in the wage of that ongoing
job spell. The estimated coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from one at conventional
11The hypothesis that the tenure-wage proﬁles have the same shape for the 1981–1995 start cohorts cannot
be rejected at the 5% level (F14,123 = 1.57, p-value=0.10).
24Table 3: Results, High School Men, Second-stage Regression
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Ratchet 1.128 (0.363)*** 0.906 (0.397)**
Below 0.300 (.221)
Tenure 0.013 (0.004)*** 0.013 (0.004)*** 0.016 (0.004)***
Spline -0.018 (0.008)** -0.018 (0.007)** -0.019 (0.007)**
Cohort Slope Interactions
1984 0.006 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007)
1987 -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
1989 -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
1995 0.007 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006)
1997 0.011 (0.005)** 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006)
1999 0.015 (0.006)** 0.006 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006)
2001 0.022 (0.007)*** 0.012 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008)
2003 0.040 (0.010)*** 0.014 (0.013) 0.016 (0.013)
2005 0.039 (0.020)* 0.021 (0.020) 0.021 (0.020)
Cohort Spline Interactions
1984 -0.000 (0.013) 0.013 (0.013) 0.011 (0.013)
1987 0.010 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 0.005 (0.011)
1989 0.014 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010) 0.009 (0.011)
1995 0.021 (0.028) 0.015 (0.027) 0.014 (0.027)
Cohort Intercepts
1984 -0.091 (0.029)*** -0.101 (0.028)*** -0.106 (0.028)***
1987 -0.050 (0.027)* -0.050 (0.026)* -0.055 (0.026)**
1989 -0.064 (0.029)** -0.064 (0.028)** -0.067 (0.028)**
1995 -0.141 (0.030)*** -0.154 (0.030)*** -0.154 (0.030)***
1997 -0.159 (0.027)*** -0.161 (0.026)*** -0.163 (0.026)***
1999 -0.158 (0.028)*** -0.160 (0.027)*** -0.160 (0.027)***
2001 -0.160 (0.029)*** -0.150 (0.028)*** -0.150 (0.028)***
2003 -0.180 (0.031)*** -0.178 (0.030)*** -0.181 (0.029)***
2005 -0.124 (0.032)*** -0.124 (0.031)*** -0.126 (0.031)***
2007 -0.104 (0.033)*** -0.104 (0.032)*** -0.106 (0.032)***
Constant 2.672 (0.022)*** 2.672 (0.021)*** 2.674 (0.021)***
R2 0.831 0.842 0.843
N 168 168 168
Notes: *, **, *** indicate diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels of signiﬁcance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
With the exception of 1984, intercepts and slope/spline interactions
for even years are not reported here. See the web appendix for even
year estimates. Estimated using WLS, with the inverse of the stan-
dard error from the ﬁrst stage regressions used as weights. First
stage regressors consist of 4 age indicators, 13 industry indicators,
9 province indicators and 168 cohort-tenure indicators. The cohort-
tenure indicators are the depend variable for the above regressions.
25signiﬁcance levels. Inclusion of the Ratchet variable reduces the slope coeﬃcients of the
post-97 entry cohorts by a third or more, and it is no longer possible to reject the hypothesis
that the underlying shape of the wage-tenure proﬁles are the same across all job cohorts
(F23,122=1.12, p-value=0.34). These results suggest that re-contracting accounts for much
of the apparent steepening of the wage proﬁles for the most recent entry cohorts as well as
for the 1984 cohort.
In Column 3, we include the Below variable as a regressor. This variable captures
contemporaneous movements in the entry wage that are below the maximum experienced
during an ongoing job spell. In section 2, we noted that an implication of the spot market
is that wages in ongoing spells should be as responsive to this variable as they are to the
ratchet variable. With the inclusion of this variable, the Ratchet variable continues to be
statistically signiﬁcant, and although somewhat smaller in magnitude than the estimate
obtained in column 2, the estimated coeﬃcient is still not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one.
In contrast, the coeﬃcient on Below is not signiﬁcant, and has a magnitude close to zero.
Once more, the hypothesis that all cohorts share a common wage-tenure proﬁle cannot be
rejected (F24,121=.80, p-value=0.75). These results are consistent with the re-contracting
model.1213
As we noted in Section 2, this speciﬁcation is consistent with a model of general human
capital. If human capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, then recontracting should only occur when the
entry wage exceeds the wage in an ongoing spell, inclusive of returns to job tenure. The
diﬃculty in implementing this, of course, is that we cannot determine when re-contracting
is needed by comparing entry wages to the actual wage at tenure, j, for a given cohort
since the latter wage already reﬂects any re-contracting. Instead, we need to construct a
wage using a tenure proﬁle unaﬀected by renegotiation. To do this, we used data for the
1981 cohort alone. Of all the cohorts we observe, this is the one least likely to experience
recontracting, as it enters the job market under the most favorable conditions of all the
12To check further on age composition eﬀects, we also ran a single-stage regression with the controls used
in the ﬁrst stage, along with cohort-speciﬁc wage-tenure proﬁles, full interactions between age groups and
cohort intercepts, and full interactions between age groups and tenure. The results are consistent with what
we have reported so far, with steepening proﬁles for more recent cohorts, and the same pattern of decline
and partial recovery in entry wages. Results are available in the online appendix.
13We obtain broadly similar results working with women, which are reported in the online appendix. Wage
proﬁles steepen for the post-97 cohorts and the coeﬃcient on the Ratchet variable is positive and signiﬁcant.
26cohorts we use. If the recontracting model holds, this cohort can thus be used to obtain an
estimate of the “pure” wage-tenure proﬁle.
Estimating a wage equation including only the 1981 entry cohort results in a tenure
coeﬃcient of .017 (with a standard error of .002) and a spline interaction after the ﬁrst
ten years of -.023 (with standard error of .005).14 We also estimated entry wages for each
cohort using the same set of controls, but using only workers with up to one year of job
tenure and a set of start year dummies. We used these two sets of estimates to construct a
set of counterfactual wage-tenure proﬁles for each cohort. These wages were then compared
with the entry wages of subsequent entry cohorts. For the 149 observations exceeding one
year of job tenure, there were only 9 cases where the constructed wage proﬁles did not
exceed a subsequent entry wage. This implies that if implicit contracts are to account for
the general steepening of the wage proﬁles after 1997, then the returns to job tenure must
represent general human capital or matching since a speciﬁc human capital framework does
not imply adequate opportunities for recontracting to account for the observed steepening.
To emphasize this point, note that entry wages increased by .13 log points between 1995
and 2007, or approximately .010 log points a year. As the return to a year of job tenure
was .017 log points a year for the 1981 cohort, wage growth at that rate would result in
wages in ongoing spells easily outpacing the changes in entry wages for subsequent cohorts
after 1997.
4.4 Robustness of the Results
The results reported above were obtained using cohort-speciﬁc spline functions for the
wage-tenure proﬁle in the second-stage regression. We next investigate the sensitivity of
our results to alternative speciﬁcations of the wage-tenure proﬁle. In the existing literature
evaluating the role of implicit contracts to account for wages over the business cycle, a wide
array of functional forms are used. Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) use a linear function, Grant
(2003) uses a quadratic function, while Devereux and Hart (2007) use a cubic function. To
examine the robustness of our results to alternative speciﬁcations, we estimated a model
14The regression includes a spline speciﬁcation for the tenure proﬁle and controls for union status, industry,
age, and province of residence.
27which imposes a common non-parametric wage-tenure proﬁle for all cohorts. In a speciﬁca-
tion including the Ratchet variable but not Below, the estimated coeﬃcient on Ratchet was
1.30 (s.e. of .15); while in a speciﬁcation including both Ratchet and Below, the estimated
coeﬃcients were .95 (s.e. of .18) and .43 (s.e. of .12), respectively.15
The Ratchet and Below coeﬃcients from the common tenure proﬁle speciﬁcation are
not strictly consistent with any of the three models outlined in Section 2. However, they
do imply that the wages in ongoing spells only partially track conditions in the labour
market, with increases in start wages above the previous maximum in the job spell having
a much stronger eﬀect on wages in that spell than other movements in the current start
wage. These results mirror the ﬁndings in the business cycle literature. Only Beaudry and
Dinardo (1991) ﬁnd evidence that the tightest labour market conditions during a job spell
fully determines the current wages. Both Grant (2003) and Devereux and Hart (2007) ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient on the contemporaneous unemployment rate as well.
McDonald and Worswick (1999) obtain similar results for Canadian nonimmigrant males,
but they also ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate at the time of entry;
this result may reﬂect the non-stationarity of Canadian wages during their study period
(1980–92). Although we are examining non-cyclical wage patterns, our results also indicate
that both the tightest labour market during a job spell and the current labour market play
roles in the behaviour of the wages of high school men. Given the long term nature of the
decline, it may be that ﬁrms faced bankruptcy constraints that prevented them from fully
insuring against such a decline. Gamber (1988) uses a two-period model to illustrate that
such constraints may result in wage contracts that respond asymmetrically to permanent
and temporary shocks. In particular, in states where the bankruptcy constraint is binding,
ﬁrms are unable to insure fully.
15A visual examination of the non-parametric speciﬁcation suggests that a cubic proﬁle describes the data
well.
285 The Role of Unionization Revisited
So far, our results are based on a simple regression framework in which union membership
results in a common premium for all workers.16 Empirical studies on union wage eﬀects
indicate the returns to experience tend to be lower in the union sector (Kuhn, 1998). If the
union premium is higher for entrants, and if non-union workers experience a higher return
to tenure, then the falling entry wages and steepening wage-tenure proﬁles we observe may
be driven by eﬀects of de-unionization that are not taken into account in this model, rather
than by recontracting. To examine this issue further, we estimate our model separately
for union and non-union workers. We begin with cohort-speciﬁc spline functions for the
wage-tenure proﬁle. Results are presented in Table 4.
The results for the non-union workers are similar to those for the pooled sample. In
the absence of the Ratchet variable (Column 1), the wage proﬁles steepen for the most re-
cent entry cohort. The cohort intercepts show the same pattern of decline until the 1990s,
followed by signs of partial recovery in wages. The wage-tenure proﬁles are steeper than
those in the pooled sample, and while they become ﬂatter after 10 years of job tenure, the
point estimate implies further wage growth at longer lengths of job tenure. Inclusion of the
variables of interest (Column 2) results in a somewhat larger estimate of the Ratchet coeﬃ-
cient, but little indication that wages respond to outside conditions, except to recontract to
match a wage that exceeds the highest during the job spell. Again, once the implicit con-
tract variables are included, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the wage proﬁles
have identical slopes across cohorts (F24,121=.90, p-value=0.60). The point estimate of the
Ratchet coeﬃcient implies overbidding to retain current employees, but again the estimate
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one.
Following the procedure that was used for the pooled sample, we estimated our model
for the non-union sector imposing a common, non-parametric speciﬁcation for the wage-
tenure proﬁle. As with the pooled sample, this proﬁle could be closely approximated with a
cubic. The estimates of the coeﬃcients of Ratchet and Below were .95 and .43 respectively,
with standards errors of .24 and .23. These estimates are similar to the estimates that we
16The estimated union premium is .171.




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ratchet 1.461 (0.497)*** 0.071 (0.244)
Below 0.119 (.309) 0.123 (0.107)
Tenure 0.017 (0.005)*** 0.019 (0.006)*** 0.010 (0.004)** 0.011 (0.004)**
Spline -0.007 (0.010) -0.008 (0.010) -0.024 (0.008)*** -0.022 (0.008)***
Cohort Slope Interactions
1984 0.010 (0.008) -0.006 (0.009) -0.008 (0.007) -0.007 (0.007)
1987 -0.004 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005)
1989 -0.001 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.011 (0.005)** -0.009 (0.005)*
1995 0.007 (0.007) -0.009 (0.008) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006)
1997 0.012 (0.006)* -0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.006) -0.000 (0.006)
1999 0.017 (0.007)** 0.004 (0.008) 0.008 (0.006) 0.007 (0.007)
2001 0.019 (0.009)** 0.005 (0.010) 0.019 (0.009)** 0.016 (0.009)*
2003 0.043 (0.013)*** 0.011 (0.016) 0.020 (0.013) 0.014 (0.014)
2005 0.049 (0.025)* 0.031 (0.024) -0.014 (0.026) -0.023 (0.027)
Cohort Spline Interactions
1984 -0.020 (0.017) 0.007 (0.019) 0.028 (0.014)** 0.026 (0.014)*
1987 0.007 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014) 0.015 (0.011) 0.012 (0.011)
1989 0.001 (0.014) -0.000 (0.014) 0.030 (0.011)*** 0.026 (0.011)**
1995 0.009 (0.036) 0.008 (0.035) 0.049 (0.030) 0.038 (0.031)
Cohort Intercepts
1984 -0.126 (0.037)*** -0.148 (0.037)*** 0.008 (0.033) 0.007 (0.032)
1987 -0.062 (0.035)* -0.068 (0.034)** -0.007 (0.030) -0.008 (0.030)
1989 -0.086 (0.037)** -0.086 (0.035)** -0.002 (0.032) -0.006 (0.032)
1995 -0.148 (0.038)*** -0.167 (0.037)*** -0.082 (0.036)** -0.087 (0.036)**
1997 -0.160 (0.034)*** -0.163 (0.033)*** -0.133 (0.031)*** -0.134 (0.031)***
1999 -0.152 (0.035)*** -0.154 (0.034)*** -0.164 (0.033)*** -0.166 (0.033)***
2001 -0.147 (0.036)*** -0.135 (0.035)*** -0.167 (0.035)*** -0.160 (0.035)***
2003 -0.169 (0.038)*** -0.175 (0.037)*** -0.202 (0.037)*** -0.197 (0.037)***
2005 -0.119 (0.040)*** -0.123 (0.039)*** -0.117 (0.039)*** -0.115 (0.039)***
2007 -0.107 (0.041)** -0.108 (0.040)*** -0.033 (0.041) -0.034 (0.041)
Constant 2.666 (0.028)*** 2.667 (0.027)*** 2.835 (0.024)*** 2.835 (0.024)***
R2 0.830 0.842 0.709 0.711
N 168 168 168 168
Notes: *, **, *** indicate diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of sig-
niﬁcance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. With the exception of 1984,
intercepts and slope/spline interactions are not reported for even years. Estimated us-
ing WLS, with the inverse of the standard error from the ﬁrst stage regressions used
as weights. First stage regressors consist of 4 age indicators, 13 industry indicators, 9
province indicators and the 168 entry-tenure indicators used as the dependent variable
in the second-stage.
30obtained using the pooled sample, and again indicate asymmetries in how wages in ongoing
spells respond to various changes in labour market conditions. Wages in ongoing spells
adjust fully when entry wages rise above the highest wage experienced so far during the
spell, but only decrease partially when wages for entrants fall.
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(b) Union
The results for unionized workers imply a much diﬀerent wage pattern over time. When
the implicit contract variables are not included (column 3), we see that union entry wages
did not start falling until after 1990. Wage-tenure proﬁles are also ﬂatter and, unlike the
non-union sector, there is little evidence that wage proﬁles steepened for the most recent
31cohorts. Consistent with these ﬁnding, the coeﬃcients on the contracting variables are small
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (Column 4).
The estimated contract variable eﬀects for union workers would seem to be consistent
with the full commitment model. However, the Ratchet and Below variables used to obtain
the union results were computed using entry wages in the union sector, which followed
a somewhat diﬀerent pattern that those for the non-union sector. In Figure 6, we plot
composition-controlled entry wages for union and non-union workers. As expected, given
the predominance of non-union jobs at entry, entry wages for non-union workers closely
resemble the entry wage for the pooled sample. For both the non-union and pooled samples,
variation in Ratchet comes from the recovery from the early 1980s recession and from the
general upswing after 1995, while variation in Below comes from the same recession, along
with the decline between 1990 and 1995, and the economic slow-down in the early 2000s. In
the union sector there is little variation in entry wages with which to identify the Ratchet
coeﬃcient, and the only substantive variation in Below comes from the decline in entry
wages between 1990 and 1995. Thus, our results for the union sector appear to be driven
by the lack of useful variation in entry wages over our study period and it is diﬃcult to
support speciﬁc conclusions from them.
6 Technological Change and Entry Wage Movements
To this point, we have established that an implicit contract model with renegotiation pro-
vides a reasonably good ﬁt for the wage patterns of Canadian less skilled workers. This
in turn implies that understanding wage movements in this market comes down to under-
standing what is driving patterns in entry wages. Our earlier decomposition results indicate
that shifts in unionization and industrial composition played only a small role in determin-
ing the entry wage movements – accounting for only a quarter of the decline between 1981
and 1997, and none of the post-1997 recovery. In this section, we brieﬂy examine whether
technological change can explain the remaining movements in entry wages.
Research over the last 15 years on technological change and the labour market sug-
gests that a combination of relative factor supply movements and technical change could
32help understand wage movements beyond those due to compositional shifts (e.g., Katz and
Murphy (1992) and the large volume of research that followed it). Thus, consider a con-
stant returns to scale aggregate production function with inputs being unskilled labour, U,
skilled labour, S, and physical capital, K. If we allow for technical change that enhances un-
skilled and skilled labour at potentially diﬀerent rates, then equating the marginal product
for unskilled workers to their wage and taking a log-linear approximation yields a simple
equation:
ln(wU






) + α3t + et (14)
where α3 reﬂects the impact of skill biased technical change on unskilled wages.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 5, we present estimates of this equation where we use the
average wage of nonunion, high school or less educated workers with one year or less of
job tenure for the relevant unskilled wage and use measures of aggregate unskilled and
skilled labour and physical capital described in Appendix B. We use the nonunion entry
wage to control for shifts in union composition.17 We use annual observations on each of
the variables and so have only 19 observations. While this is a small number, our results
from the previous sections indicate that understanding the low skilled wage structure comes
down to understanding these observations. Our estimates are obtained employing weights
corresponding to the number of observations underlying the average wage in each year.
The resulting estimates indicate that an increase in unskilled labour leads to an increase
in the unskilled wage. This is the opposite of what theory predicts but the estimated
coeﬃcient is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the time trend is
also small and statistically insigniﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance level. In contrast,
the coeﬃcient on the ratio of skilled labour to physical capital has a strong and statistically
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. The R2 for the regression is .57 and only falls to .56 when we
remove the time trend. Thus, about 60% of the variation in the nonunion entry wage is
accounted for by relative factor movements.
The wage regression reported in column one has the potential for endogeneity problems
because individuals choose their education based on expected wages associated with diﬀerent
17Results when we use union starting wages are similar in spirit, again showing a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
from
St
Kt, an insigniﬁcant negative eﬀect from
Ut
Kt and a small and statistically insigniﬁcant time eﬀect.
33Table 5: The Impact of Relative Factor Movements on Nonunion Entry
Wages
No TFP Correction With TFP Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Constant -14.59 (13.01) -18.83 (32.35) -15.00 (7.23)* -31.82 (12.69)**
ln(St/Kt) -.77 (.22)*** -.94 (.34)** -.62 (.30)* -1.21 (.45)**
ln(Ut/Kt) .033 (.61) .022 (1.69) -.14 (.25) -.27 (.38)
Trend .014 (.014) .017 (.039) .0043 (.011) .022 (.015)
Number of Obs 19 19 19 19
R2 .57 - .91 -
Notes: *, **, *** indicate diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of
signiﬁcance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All speciﬁcations employ
weights equal to the sample size underlying the calculations of the average nonunion
wage.
education levels and investment decisions are based on factor price patterns, implying that
the factor ratio variables may be correlated with the error term. Beaudry and Green (2005)
argue that shifts in the age distribution of the population are plausible instruments for the
factor ratios because the movement of the baby boom through the age structure (and its
replacement of earlier, less educated cohorts) will shift the stocks of U and S but, unless
fertility decisions in the years just after WWII were based on accurate predictions of wage
movements decades later, they are not expected to be related to current wage movements.
Further, given that investment and savings vary with age, shifts in the age structure may
also determine capital formation patterns. The estimates presented in columns 2 and 4
use the proportion of the population in ten year age groups from 20 to 60 as well as the
proportion aged 60 and over as instruments for St/Kt and Ut/Kt.18 The column 2 results
indicate that addressing endogeneity in this way does not change the basic conclusions from
column 1: the eﬀect of St/Kt is large, negative and statistically signiﬁcant, while the eﬀects
of both Ut/Kt and time are small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
The speciﬁc values taken by the estimated coeﬃcients reﬂect a similar pattern to those
obtained by Beaudry and Green (2005) for the US. In their derivation of the low skilled
18The instruments perform well in the ﬁrst stage. The F statistic associated with the joint hypothesis
that the age proportion variable eﬀects are zero is 129.94 for the St/Kt regression. The same statistic for
the St/Kt regression is 35.75. Given that the 99th percentile critical value for these statistics (which are
distributed F(4,11)) is 5.67, the hypothesis that the instruments have a zero eﬀect in the ﬁrst stage is easily
rejected.
34wage equation, they allow for possible eﬀects of general productivity movements captured
in TFP measures on relative factor supplies.19 When we use their adjusted variables, we
obtain the results presented in column 3. These are quite similar to their results for the US,
where the coeﬃcients (standard errors) they estimate in their low skilled wage equation are
-.69 (.31) and -.0020 (.32) for their S/K and U/K variables, respectively, and .0059 (.012)
on the time trend. They argue that these coeﬃcients ﬁt with an induced technical change
model in which ﬁrms can choose between a skilled and an unskilled intensive technology.20
In that case, the coeﬃcients imply that increases in the supply of skilled labour induce ﬁrms
to choose the skill intensive technology. This, in turn, leads to less capital being applied to
unskilled workers and declines in their wages. Thus, the key variable in determining wage
movements is the relative supplies of skilled labour and capital, as we see in our estimates.
Finally, in column 4, we use the TFP adjusted variables but instrument using the same
instruments as in column 2. Again, the instruments perform well in the ﬁrst stage and the
results are similar in spirit to those from OLS. The coeﬃcients estimated using instrumental
variables are all larger in magnitude than those obtained from OLS.
The results presented in Table 5 do not ﬁt with some other notable models of wage
impacts of technical change. In particular, the model set out in Katz and Murphy (1992),
which involves a more restrictive speciﬁcation for the aggregate technology, implies that
holding U and K constant, an increase in S should lead to an increase in the unskilled
wage as unskilled labour becomes relatively scarce. This eﬀect corresponds to α1 in the
above speciﬁcation. Our estimates of α1 are strong and negative: the opposite of the Katz-
Murphy prediction. Similarly, Krusell et al. (2000) argue that capital-skill complementarity
and an increase in the eﬀective capital stock explain wage patterns in the US in this period.
However, their model implies that an increase in capital should lead to declines in the
unskilled wage, holding U and S constant. In the estimates here, the partial eﬀect of capital
corresponds to −(α1+α2), which has a strong positive sign: the opposite of the results that
Krusell et al. (2000) obtain with a more restrictive production speciﬁcation. Indeed, while
19Speciﬁcally, they use adjusted ratios, ln(S
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20This model is similar in spirit to those in Basu and Weil (1998) and Caselli (1999).
35the arguments in these earlier papers imply that increases in education will have beneﬁcial
eﬀects for the less skilled because they become a relatively scarce factor, the estimated
results here (and the model in Beaudry and Green (2005)) point to the opposite conclusion.
In the technology selection model, as long as the economy remains in the period of transition
in which ﬁrms are choosing between the two types of technologies, increasing the education
level will beneﬁt those who obtain the education but the remaining unskilled will have less
and less capital to work with and will be left further behind as the number of skilled workers
increases. What will help unskilled workers, given these estimates, is increases in physical
capital. This, broadly speaking, would imply that the expanding group of skilled workers
can be outﬁtted without taking capital away from the unskilled.
Given the predominant role of the S/K variable in the estimates in Table 5, the im-
plication is that we can understand movements in entry wages in terms of productivity
movements induced by relative movements in human and physical capital. During the long
decline, education levels were rising faster than capital per worker but after 1997 this was
reversed as capital ﬂowed into Canada and expansion in the stock of skilled labour slowed.
In this section, the model underlying equation (14) assumes that wages represent the
marginal product of unskilled labour. If wages are indeed governed by implicit contracts,
as we have argued in the previous sections, entry wages in any given year will depend
on a combination of productivity in that year and expectations about future productivity,
meaning that entry wages will not be perfectly correlated with current period marginal
product. Thus, we view these results as suggestive; potentially ﬁtting with a notion that
ﬁrms and workers are relatively myopic in productivity projections.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the wage patterns of high school educated males in Canada. The
last three decades have witnessed a dramatic drop in their real wages up to the mid–1990s
followed by a recovery that has still left them with real wages well below their 1981 peak.
The time pattern was quite diﬀerent for workers with diﬀerent amounts of job tenure,
however. Workers whose jobs started in the early 1980s, and hence had high job tenure in
36the 1990s and 2000s, had wages that were seemingly unaﬀected by downturns and upturns
in the wages of new job starters. Our primary interest is in understanding this pattern.
We argue that the wage-tenure patterns for less skilled Canadian workers over the period
1981–2007 ﬁts well with an implicit contracting model with renegotiation. In such a model,
workers are at least partially insured against falls in wages but can ratchet up their wages
in strong economic times. This raises important concerns for the ﬂexibility of wages in this
market in a period when Canada appears headed into an economic downturn.
Within the context of an implicit contracting model with renegotiaton, understanding
overall wage movements comes down to understanding movements in entry wages. We
show that the composition of new jobs has shifted over the last twenty-ﬁve years, with
particularly dramatic declines in unionization levels of new job starters. However, a standard
decomposition exercise indicates that these shifts explain only about a quarter of the decline
in entry wages between 1981 and 1997 and none of the increase after 1997. Instead, we need
to look for explanations for why productivity ﬁrst declined and then increased for this group.
In the last section of the paper, we argue that a model in which technological change is
induced by relative factor ﬂows provides a potential explanation. In particular, according
to this model, unskilled wages declined because physical capital did not grow fast enough to
outﬁt the expanding stock of skilled workers without reducing the amount of capital applied
to unskilled workers. This process was reversed after 1997 as capital inﬂows outstripped
increases in the number of skilled workers. If this is true, it implies that help for unskilled
workers may lie mainly in the capital market.
Appendix A The Size of Synthetic Cohorts
Table A-1 shows the number of observations available at several lengths of the job spell
for all the cohorts in our data set. The number of observations falls dramatically after
the ﬁrst year, and then continues to taper oﬀ gradually over time. These ﬁgures do not
represent actual attrition from job spells, since the design of the samples diﬀers somewhat.
For example, in the 1995 SWA, which we use only for the 1995 job entry cohort, there is no
imputation for missing values and only half of the available LFS sample is surveyed; as a
37Table A-1: Number of observations, High School Men, By Start Year and
Duration of Job Spell, Selected Durations
Start Year Years of Job Tenure
0 1 2 5 10 15
1981 2,476 442
1984 1,886 574 210 151
1986 2,117 1,519 518 187
1987 2,641 927 455 307 167
1988 2,319 1,066 670 287 163
1989 1,882 1,113 276 160
1990 1,736 251 204
1995 521 582 360 227
1997 1,759 785 571 355 252
1998 1,650 716 558 337
1999 1,730 711 607 360
2000 1,599 768 623 451
2001 1,571 742 551 331
2002 1,434 611 518 373
2003 1,436 675 517
2004 1,433 717 592
2005 1,531 917 599
2006 1,679 877
2007 1,631
result, the number of observations is considerably smaller than other years. Blank entries
indicate cases where a spell of a particular length either (i) occurs in a year for which data
is unavailable (e.g. 1992) or (ii) has not yet occurred (e.g. 2005 job starters with 5 years of
job tenure). The key point from the table is that we have suﬃcient observations to establish
wage patterns even at long job durations.
Appendix B Non-Wage Data
In this appendix, we provide information on the non-wage data series used in the paper.
We use net capital stock series (residential and non-residential) from Statistics Canada for
our physical capital stock measure. For both high and low skilled workers, we construct
measures of total hours worked using the SCF from 1981 through 1997. In particular, for
each worker, we construct total hours worked by multiplying weeks worked in the previous
year times hours worked in the reference week. We then sum these hours (multiplying by
38the weights provided in order to provide an estimate at population level) for each of three
education groups: high school or less; some or completed post-secondary (less than a BA);
and BA or higher university education. The education categories were reformed in 1990.
To address this, we estimated a simple regression of the hours series on a cubic in time plus
a dummy variable equalling one for 1990 and after. We ﬁnd that this approach - with a
common time trend before and after 1990 combined with a step up or down - ﬁt the various
data series very well. We subtract the coeﬃcient on the post-1990 dummy variable from the
total hours series in all post-1990 years to construct a smoothed series for total hours for
each education group. We use SLID data for the years 1997-2005 and the LFS for the years
2006–07 in a similar way to construct the hours series for those years, using the overlap
years of 1997 and 2004/05 to normalize the SLID and LFS based series to the SCF based
series. We need to combine our three education categories into two skill groups. To do this,
we follow Katz and Murphy (1992), creating a low skilled group that consists of the high
school or less education category plus .44 times the some post-secondary category. The
high skilled group contains the university educated plus .56 times the some post-secondary
group.
Finally, we require a TFP series which is consistent with the three factor (skilled labour,
unskilled labour and capital) production function we employ. To do this, we construct a
weighted average of growth in each of the inputs in each year, using the share of each factor
in total income in 1981 as the weights. We then subtract that weighted average from the
growth in GDP for each year to generate the annual change in TFP and then cumulate
those changes to get a TFP level measure (measured relative to 1981).
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